Abstract-Privacy is faced with serious challenges in the ubiquitous computing world. In order to handle this problem, some researchers in recent years have focused on design and analysis of privacy-friendly ultralightweight authentication protocols. Although the majority of these schemes have been broken to a greater or lesser extent, most of these attacks are based on ad-hoc methods that are not extensible to a large class of ultralightweight protocols. So this research area still suffers from the lack of structured cryptanalysis and evaluation methods. In this paper, we introduce new frameworks for full disclosure attacks on ultralightweight authentication protocols based on new concepts of recursive linear and recursive differential cryptanalysis. The recursive linear attack is passive, deterministic, and requires only a single authentication session, if it can be applied successfully. The recursive differential attack is more powerful and can be applied to the protocols on which the linear attack may not work. This attack is probabilistic, active in the sense that the attacker suffices only to block some specific messages, and requires a few authentication sessions. Having introduced these frameworks in a general view, we apply them on some well-known ultralightweight protocols. The first attack can retrieve all the secret data of Yeh et al. and SLMAP authentication protocols and the second one can retrieve all the secret data of LMAP , SASI, and David-Prasad authentication protocols.
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I. INTRODUCTION
R ADIO Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology for automatically unique identification or tracking of the objects using wireless systems. The importance of the RFID technology is twofold: Firstly, It has rapidly proliferated in recent years as its widespread applications can be seen everywhere, ranging from libraries to supply chains. Secondly, it is regarded as the predecessor technology for the upcoming ubiquitous computing technology.
Despite the advantages and promises, this technology has raised many potential aspects for abuse, concerning the security and privacy of the consumers. In recent years, the cryptographic community have made an extensive effort to recommend mechanisms to respond to or at least limit such misuses. Roughly speaking, the aim of all the researches in this area is to design a privacy friendly mutual authentication protocol to be consistent with the inherent limitations of the lightweight environments. In summary, the primal requirements for an RFID mutual authentication protocol are resistance against traceability attacks, desynchronization attacks, and full disclosure attacks. The full disclosure attack i.e., the recovery of all the static and dynamic secrets stored in the tag, is the strongest one which implies all the other types of the attacks.
In this paper we focus on ultralightweight protocols that according to Chein's terminology [1] refers to the protocols that only involve simple bitwise operations (like XOR, AND, OR, modular addition, etc.) on tags. Ultralightweight authentication protocols first introduced by Peris-Lopez et al. by UMAP family [2] - [4] , though they were named later by Chien [1] . Since then, lots of protocols in this category have been proposed. Due to the not-so-long life of these protocols and considering many constrains that the designers of such protocols are faced to, the majority of them have been broken to a greater or lesser extent. Except a few cases [5] and [6] , most of these attacks are based on ad-hoc methods that are not extensible to a large class of ultralightweight protocols. The approach of [5] is based on building progressive knowledge on the tag's static identifier ( ), given a series of observations and is applied successfully to SASI [1] and Yeh et al. protocol [7] . In [6] a method for full disclosure attack of all secrets of the protocol using Grobner basis is introduced where successful attacks on a number of ultralightweight protocols, including UMAP family [2] - [4] , and SASI [1] is presented. A different approach is adopted in [8] where a passive full disclosure attack on David-Prasad protocol [24] is presented. It exploits the weak nonlinearity of the functions used in protocol and finds the best linear approximations for the secret values with the highest possible bias.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce new frameworks for evaluating the security of ultralightweight authentication protocols. We call them recursive linear and recursive differential cryptanalysis which is shown to be efficient yet general techniques for full disclosure of all secrets of those ultralightweight authentication protocols that exclusively or widely use triangular functions.
We first introduce the outline of the recursive linear cryptanalysis. This attack is passive, deterministic (i.e., the attacker can retrieve all the secrets with probability of one), and requires only 1556-6013/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE a single authentication session. Yeh et al. [7] and SLMAP [11] authentication protocols are two examples of ultralightweight protocols which are successfully cryptanalyzed by this technique.
In the following we introduce the recursive differential cryptanalysis. This attack is more powerful and can be applied to the protocols which linear attack may not work on. The recursive differential attack is probabilistic, active in the sense that the attacker suffices only to block some specific messages, and requires a few authentication sessions. We show the effectiveness of this attack on [16] and SASI [1] authentication protocols in detail and also report our results on David-Prasad Protocol [24] .
The advantages of the proposed frameworks can be regarded as follows: 1) Generality. Developing new general cryptanalitical techniques that can be applied to a considerable amount of ultralightweight protocols. 2) Efficiency. Improving the results of almost all the existing attacks. 3) Design Criteria. Due to the generality and structural nature of these attacks, they can be regarded as a design criteria for the upcoming ultralightweight schemes to be designed.
B. Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we present a general view of ultralightweight authentication protocols and list the most important common features of the existing schemes. In Section III we present the framework of the recursive linear cryptanalysis and apply it to two well known protocols: SLMAP and Yeh et al. protocol. In Section IV we describe the framework of recursive differential attack and apply it to two other important ultralightweight protocols: and SASI. We conclude our work in Section V where some discussions about the protocols on which our techniques are not successful are given.
II. ULTRALIGHTWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
Since the introduction of ultralightweight authentication protocols by Peris-Lopez et al. [2] - [4] , lots of proposals have been presented in this field. Avoine et al. have made a comprehensive survey on the most important proposed ultralightweight protocols [5] :
A. Use of Index Pseudonym
The tag uses a preshared temporary index pseudonym, namely , to identify itself to the reader. Due to privacy considerations, The static identifier, , is never sent in clear on the channel.
B. Messages Pattern
All the ultralightweight protocols share the same pattern of exchanged messages which is shown in Fig. 1 . The static has been preshared between two parties. In addition, The tag shares with the reader a (potentially vector) dynamic session key as well as the dynamic index pseudonym allocated to each session. The pair is called the state of the tag. The reader first sends a message to which the tag answers with its current index pseudonym . The reader searches its database indexed by its to find its relevant secrets. Then, the reader generates a (potentially vector) nonce, namely . It then computes and sends message to the tag.
contains two parts, the first one wraps with a key dependent quantity, and the second part is a parameter by which the tag can authenticate the reader. Upon authenticating the reader, the tag sends the message to the reader, which is used by the reader to authenticate the tag. Both and are vectorial parameters (i.e., they can be composed of one or more messages).
In some schemes, the session ends here (Type 1 schemes). If so, the tag updates its state after sending and the reader do that after receiving the valid . The update procedure in both parties is performed as . In some other schemes, After receiving the valid , the reader updates its state and then sends a message to the tag (that potentially contains some secret dependent parameters, too). The tag does not update its state unless it receive this message (Type 2 schemes).
C. Use of -Functions
Due to the inherent limitations of ultralightweight environments, most of such protocols extensively use triangular functions ( -functions) for . -functions, first introduced in [9] , are bijective functions with the property of i.e., the bit of the output word depends only on bits of the input word(s) and does not depend on the more significant input bits. This feature is widely exploited in both recursive linear and differential attacks. As we will see in the next two Sections, this property gives the attacker the possibility to recover secret variables one by one, starting from the least significant bit.
D. Desynchronization Attack Prevention
The state update procedure is performed at the end of each session. i.e., when the last message is transmitted. The party that sends the last message, update its state immediately after sending the message without being assured whether or not this message is correctly received by the receiver. The party that receives the last message update its state upon the correct receipt of this message. Therefore if the second party could not get the last message correctly, it does not update its state while the other one has done; resulting a desynchronization between the two parties. In order to avoid this potential problem, the party that first updates its state (i.e., the transmitter of the last message), must keep a backup of its previous state as well.
Although this trick is very consistent with ultralightweight environments' constraints, it gives the attacker the opportunity to force the two parties to work in their old state. This property is exploited in recursive differential cryptanalysis, as will be described in Section IV. Table I shows the list of the notations used in this paper. The least significant bit (LSB) of is and the most significant bit (MSB) is . The subscript is always taken modulo but the term " " is eliminated for convenience.
III. RECURSIVE LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS
Recursive linear cryptanalysis directly exploits -functions in . In this attack, the attacker creates a system of independent linear equations for each bit of secret variables. Then she starts solving these systems of equations from the LSB and retrieves all secret data bits in a recursive manner. The steps of the attack is as follows:
1) Determine all the unknown variables (static and dynamic secrets and nonces) for a single session of the protocol. This includes and all the components of and . The LSB of carries and borrows are zero all so, the unique solution of the system directly yields the LSB of unknown variables. Now you can compute the intermediate variables' next bits which should be known when you solve the system of equations of the next bit. In general, when solving the system of equations, the bits of the intermediate variables are needed which have been calculated in the previous step . (The recursive property of attack) Therefore, the recursive linear cryptanalysis recovers all secret bits one by one with probability of one, provided that there exist enough number of independent linear equations.
It should be noted that the recursive linear cryptanalysis is a deterministic method i.e., it recovers the secret data with success probability of one. This terminology is adopted due to the linear essence of the attack as well as its recursive nature in recovering the secret data bits. However, the term "linear attack" [10] in symmetric cryptography refers to a well known technique in cryptanalysis of symmetric primitives. This technique is based on finding linear approximations for nonlinear relations of the cipher with maximum possible bias that is a probabilistic method in the sense that the attacker success ratio depends on the amounts of available data. We highlight that the recursive linear cryptanalysis of Ultralightweight protocols presented in this paper is totally different from the linear cryptanalysis of symmetric primitives and should not be mixed up with that concept.
In the next subsections the performance of the recursive linear cryptanalysis for the full disclosure attacks on two ultralightweight protocols is examined.
A. Recursive Linear Cryptanalysis of SLMAP 1) History:
In 2007, Li and Wang proposed the ultralightweight mutual authentication protocol SLMAP intended for very low-cost RFID tags [11] . This protocol is analyzed by Hernandez-Castro et al. [12] by a traceability attack.
2) Specifications: This scheme is a Type 2 ultralightweight protocol, in which:
3) Cryptanalysis: Here we apply the three stages of our recursive linear cryptanalysis on the SLMAP protocol.
1) For a single session all the secret data include and . 2) Each message in SLMAP protocol, i.e., and provide a linear equation that are enough for constructing a system of independent linear equations in secret data bits. For bit of these messages we have (For more clarity, unknown variables are in bold):
(1)
Where
, and for :
3) Equations given by (1) create a system of linear equations with the following matrix representation:
Where The coefficient matrix in (2), , is nonsingular. In each step one can obtain the missing bits by solving the linear system of equations. Recall that the intermediate variables (carries) in the right side of equation have been calculated in the previous step . The exclusive use of -functions in this protocol, makes it vulnerable against recursive linear cryptanalysis. One way to avoid the exclusive use of -functions in ultralightweight environments, is the use of rotation as a non triangular ultralightweight operation. We show in the next subsection that the use of this operation does not necessarily frustrate the recursive linear attack.
B. Recursive Linear Cryptanalysis of Yeh et al. Protocol 1) History:
Yeh et al. proposed a process-oriented ultralightweight protocol in RFIDSec Asia 2010 [7] . The first attacks presented by Peris-Lopez et al. [13] in 2010, were traceability and passive full disclosure of , which requires eavesdropping of an average of 250 sessions. In 2012, Avoine et al. presented another passive full disclosure of on this protocol which requires eavesdropping of an average of 25 sessions [5] .
2) Specifications: This schemes follows Type 2 schemes in which:
Where mod mod and is a status bit indicating the success or fail of completion of the previous protocol session (respectively and ).
To be more precise:
3) Cryptanalysis: This attack works for where due to the equation , number of unknown variables is one less.
1) For a single session all the secret data include and .
2) The attacker waits for a session where and saves the messages and . Given , and (5) and (6): (7) The following linear representations for the bit of (3), (4), and (7) are sufficient for constructing a system of linear equations with nonsingular coefficient matrix: (8) Where and for :
3) Equations given by (8) hold a system of linear equations with the following matrix representation:
Where The coefficient matrix is nonsingular, whether or . In the step, the solution of the relevant system yields the bit of unknown variables . Once again, note that the values of and in the right side of (9) have been calculated in the previous step .
IV. RECURSIVE DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
As described in Section III recursive linear cryptanalysis is a straightforward and efficient manner for full disclosure attack on some ultralightweight protocols. This attack is deterministic and its success essentially depends on the existence of enough number of independent equations in unknown variables or a subset of them.
However, in some protocols, the attacker may not be so lucky to easily find such a system of equations. Often in these cases, the number of equations of a session is less than the number of unknown variables. Use of messages of one or more new sessions is neither an effective solution since new sessions bring new unknown variables as many as or even more than new equations. In such scenarios, we need a more powerful attack that can generate independent equations as many as required.
Recursive differential cryptanalysis, presented in this Section is a more effective technique for cryptanalysis of such protocols. Roughly speaking, in this attack, the attacker forces two parties to run new sessions in their previous state. This trick limits the generation of new unknown variables yet giving new equations. More precisely, when the protocol runs in the same state, all the dynamic secret variables stay the same and only new nonces are generated in each protocol run. Moreover, new nonces usually have a clear differential relation (XOR difference or modular addition difference) with the old ones that can be efficiently used for creating new independent equations. This differential relation can often be found because the wrapped nonces generated by the reader are usually delivered to the tag in message in such a way that it could be extractable by the tag. Therefore it is often XORed or added with a secret dependent quantity. Although the attacker does not know this quantity, she can obtain the difference of these two nonces since they both wrapped with the same secrets. The name of the attack is actually derived from the important role of differences.
Of course, enforcement of two parties to work in their previous state demands a kind of active attacker. To see how this process is possible, recall from Section II that in order to avoid possible desynchronization, the party that first updates its state (i.e., the transmitter of the last message), must keep a backup of its previous state, too. In the case that the tag keeps the backup data, the tag first identifies itself by its fresh at the beginning of each session. If the reader finds an entry indexed by in its database, the protocol proceeds with this indexed-pseudonym and associated dynamic secrets otherwise the reader sends another message to the tag, to which the tag will reply with . This old indexed-pseudonym will definitely be accepted by the reader. In the case that the reader keeps the backup data, the tag identifies itself by the only that it has. The reader keeps both old and new 's in its database and can extract associated dynamic secrets whether it is fresh or not. Then the protocol proceeds with the tag's and the relevant secrets.
Therefore, to force the protocol to stay in the same state, the attacker can easily block the last message of the protocol. (In the case that the tag keeps the backup data, the attacker can do this by blocking the message sent by the tag at the beginning of the protocol, too. Thereupon, the reader asks the tag to use its old and new session will be run with and .) Furthermore, the attacker can repeat this scenario as many times as required to force the parties to work on the same state for any arbitrary number of sessions.
Thus, from this perspective, this attack is a kind of active attack. However, the attacker can be regarded as a weak active attacker in the sense that she only blocks some specific messages rather than modifying them or generating new messages (this weak attacker should not be confused with weak adversary defined in privacy models [14] i.e., the adversary who is not allowed to corrupt tags).
In the following we describe the steps of the recursive differential cryptanalysis. . With a sufficient number of such equations, and due to the randomness of coefficients, there will be an overdefined system of linear equations for each bit that yields unknown variables uniquely. Solve these systems of equations starting from the LSB in which the intermediate variables (carries and borrows) are all zero. Then, compute the intermediate variables for the next bit position. In general, in order to obtain the bit of secret data, the bit of the intermediate variables need to be known, which have already computed in the previous step. (The recursive property of attack) Therefore, the recursive differential cryptanalysis recovers all secret data bits one by one with probability close to one, provided that there are sufficient number of successive sessions whose last messages are blocked. It should be mentioned that this terminology is adopted due to the differential essence of the attack as well as its recursive nature in recovering the secret data bits. However, the term "differential attack" [15] in symmetric cryptography refers to a well known technique in cryptanalysis of symmetric primitives. This technique is based on finding differential characteristics with maximum possible probability and then combining them in an appropriate manner.
Anyway, the recursive differential cryptanalysis of Ultralightweight protocols presented in this paper should not be mixed up with the differential cryptanalysis of symmetric primitives.
In the following the resistance of two ultralightweight protocol, against this method is examined. To describe the attack more conveniently, we first only consider the first two consecutive sessions, and . The variables associated with is denoted by where is its counterpart in . We describe the attack basis for a single differential pair corresponding to sessions , then extend it to more differential pairs of to complete the description of the attack scenario.
A. Recursive Differential Cryptanalysis Of Protocol 1) History: In 2008, Li proposed a new ultralightweight authentication protocol and called it
as an improvement on previous proposal [16] . In 2011, it received two cryptanalyzes: the first one proposed by Safkhani et al. [17] that described a traceability and a desynchronization attack on , and the second one was a passive full disclosure of all the secrets presented by Wang and Zhang [18] that requires eavesdropping about 480 genuine sessions.
2) Specifications: This protocol a Type 2 scheme, in which:
3) Cryptanalysis: Phase 1 is performed as described previously. The three steps of the second phase are as follows:
1) For session all the unknown data includes and . In session , the variables and stay the same (i.e., ) but is new generated. The modular addition difference of two nonces and is obtained from equations given by and . (14) and (15) (16) for , where the coefficient is known in step . This linear equation yields the unknown variable if . The coefficient is a uniform binary random variable since is uniform. Therefore, for a single differential pair of sessions , the probability of . In order to have a reliable full disclosure attack, we need a sufficient number of such differential pair of sessions , each one gives a new independent equation as follows. (17) where the superscript denotes the index of the differential pair.
So
, and are the variables corresponding to differential pair of sessions which are defined as for sessions . 3) With a sufficient number of equations (17), it is probable that there is at least one equation among these equations that . So, except for the MSB, all the bits of can be retrieved recursively starting from the LSB. Having recovered the bits of , there will be two answer for which differ only in the MSB. For each one, the other unknown variables , and can be calculated from (11) and (12) respectively. Finally, another additional equation, e.g., transmitted on the channel in the session, can be used to verify the correct answer.
4) Probability Analysis:
Here we discuss for a reliable full disclosure attack, how many differential pair of sessions , is required. The coefficients 's are independent uniform binary random variables. Hence the probability of failure for retrieving a single bit, given differential pairs is . Therefore, the probability of success for all bits is which implies that for a success probability of more than 95%, about differential pairs is required. In total, including , This attack requires twelve sessions. The theoretical success probability of the attack as well as the experimental results is depicted in Fig. 2 for . The experimental results are based on about 300 times running the attack on the simulated protocol.
B. Recursive Differential Cryptanalysis of SASI Protocol 1) History:
In 2007, Chien proposed another ultralightweight protocol called SASI (Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity) as an improvement of UMAP protocols [1] to provide authenticity and integrity and withstand all the possible attacks to which UMAP protocols are subject.
SASI received some successful cryptanalysis since its introduction. In 2008, Two traceability attacks proposed by Cao et al. [19] and Phan [20] , independently. One year later, Hernandez Castro et al. [21] presented a passive full disclosure of that recovered the least significant bits of by eavesdropping genuine successive sessions that was impractical due to its exponential data complexity. In 2009, Sun et al. presented two desynchronization attacks [22] , one of which is similar to D'Acro and De Santis desynchronization attack in [23] . In the latter paper the authors proposed an active full disclosure of and active full disclosure of all secrets, too. This attack requires an average of 309 counterfeit sessions run by the attacker. In 2011, Avoine et al. proposed the first passive full disclosure of which recovered the by eavesdropping an average of genuine sessions [5] . Another successful passive attack proposed by Han which needed only five successive sessions [6] .
2) Specifications: This schemes is Type 1, in which:
where , and and denotes the hamming weight function.
3) Cryptanalysis: Recursive linear cryptanalysis of Yeh et al. protocol shows that use of rotations as non triangular operations does not necessarily cancel out the effectiveness of the recursive linear attack. And now, cryptanalysis of SASI is an example of successful applying of recursive differential cryptanalysis to a protocol that uses rotations as non triangular operations.
Phase 1 is performed as mentioned and the second phase is as follows:
1) For session all the unknown data include and . In session , the variables and stay the same but and are new generated. We get the XOR difference of and from messages and (18) and modular difference of and from and (19):
Where and are known. 2) We can use (20) for the two sessions to obtain linear equations in some secrets. By expanding (20):
Let us define new variables , and as follows:
Thus,
We first try to find enough equations to recover unknown variables , and . For this, firstly assume that the correct values of and are known. Bit representations of (24) are as follows: (25) (26) Where , and for . Equation (25) yields one of the linear equations in three variables , and which we are looking for. To generate more equations we make use of differential relation. From (25) and (26) bit representation of differential is:
Where . So, for , (27) directly results in:
That explicitly gives the value of which is required in the next step in retrieving the unknown LSB bits. For :
Substitution (29) into (27) with some simplifications yields:
For . For , in (27) . So the expansion of (27) is slightly different:
Summarizing these two cases in a single equation gives the following linear equation in three variables , and :
Where for :
and for :
Each differential pair of sessions , results in a new linear equation with random coefficients , and :
3) In order to recursively recover all the bits of and , we require enough number of independent linear equations in . One of them is (25) . Two other required equations are given in (32) problem all the wrong guesses are detected due to the high redundancy of equations. This claim will be discussed more precisely at the end of this subsection. The recursive differential cryptanalysis ends here and yields and . In the case of SASI, an additional stage should be done to extract the secrets and from and .
After obtaining almost all the bits of and , we can find the values of and as follows from (23) and (18):
for . Hence, it holds that:
Where is known for . Therefore, the set of equations given by (39) creates a system of linear equations in variables.
Let's first assume that the set of equations given by (39) holds for all . The rank of the coefficient matrix of such linear system of equations, namely , takes some limited number of values between and depending on the values of nonuniformly distributed random variables and . which also brings new linear equations in terms of if which has a probability of 1/2. Therefore, in average we obtain from (40) more equations that along with independent equations in (39) holds an overdefined system of linear equations in (except the case which has the negligible probability of ). So the unique solution of this system, gives all the bits of . The remaining secrets, , and are also recovered by (38). 4) Probability of Success: Here, we discuss how many differential pair of sessions is required for a reliable full disclosure attack. Since 's are independent.
(43)
Equations (42), (43), (44), along with union set theory holds:
The attack success depends on the existence of at least one nonsingular matrix among all matrices in (33) for all bits and at least one nonsingular matrix among all matrices in (37) for bit . Thus, by the mentioned lemmas:
According to (46) for , it suffices that . Thus, for a reliable recursive differential cryptanalysis of SASI, 13 consecutive genuine sessions are sufficient, provided that the last message of each one is blocked. Fig. 3 shows the theoretical attack probability of success (46) in terms of the number of differential pairs ( ) as well as experimental results for . The experimental results is based on about 500 times running the simulated attack on SASI protocol for .
5) Probability of Detecting Wrong Guesses of
and : For each bit (except the MSB), there are at most eight distinct set of coefficients . Thus, there are at least equations with the coefficients that have occurred in previous. Since the probability of consistency of two equations with the same coefficients are 1/2 (i.e., the probability of equality of their associated constants ), the probability of consistency of all the equations derived for a wrong guess of . Thus, the probability of detection of all the wrong guesses is which is very close to one for and .
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
We introduced new cryptanalytical techniques for the full disclosure attack on the ultralightweight authentication protocols. We called them recursive linear and recursive differential attacks. The former is based on constructing a systems of linear equations in bit of the secret variables and solve them in a recursive manner starting from the LSB. This attack, if can be successfully applied, is very efficient since it is passive, deterministic, and requires only one authentication session. We showed the effectiveness of this attack on SLMAP and Yeh et al. protocols.
In recursive differential attack, we again try to create a system of linear equations and solve it recursively. But these linear equations are derived with the help of differential relations. This attack is more powerful than the first one and naturally has more requirements. The attacker is an active one who only blocks some specific messages of the protocols. This attack usually requires a couple of protocol sessions and reveals all secrets of the protocol with high probability of success. We showed this technique on and SASI protocols and also examined its success on David-Prasad Protocol as well. Table III summarize our results. It also includes two other protocols on which these techniques are not effective.
A. When These Techniques are Successful?
In summary, to examine the resistance of a protocol against the proposed techniques the following steps should be performed:
1) Determine all the unknown variables, including and the components of and . 6) Using the differences of this message in the first session with its counterparts in the other sessions, as well as the differential expression of the nonces driven in step 4, write a new linear equation. (Some unknowns may be eliminated in the differential equation.) 7) Exert the recursive differential attack and retrieve the unknown variables in the mentioned equation, then all the remaining ones. 8) A probability analysis is required to theoretically evaluate the amount of data required.
B. On Which Protocols These Attacks Do Not Work?
The condition of the recursive linear attack may not be met easily as is the case with all the protocols that we cryptanalyzed by recursive differential attack.
Regarding the recursive differential attack, although this technique is more general as the results shows, the limiting factor is twofold: first, when the differences of the nonce can not be extractable from message as is the case with Gossamer protocol [25] and second, when the linear equations can not be constructed due to the highly nontriangular functions used in the protocol. Examples are again Gossamer and also RAPP protocol [26] . Except a desynchronization attack [31] , Gossamer has not broken yet, whereas RAPP received more attacks such as desynchronization, traceability and full disclose attacks [27] - [30] .
As the final point, these attacks characterize the minimum requirements that should be met in the design of future ultralightweight schemes.
